Law and Lawyers:  The Road To Reform by Starr, Kenneth W.
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 63 Issue 4 Article 3 
1995 
Law and Lawyers: The Road To Reform 
Kenneth W. Starr 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Kenneth W. Starr, Law and Lawyers: The Road To Reform, 63 Fordham L. Rev. 959 (1995). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol63/iss4/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
LAW AND LAWYERS: THE ROAD TO REFORM
KENNETH W. STARR*
M Y reflections this evening, which focus on our nation's justice
system, reflect broader social concerns, going to the basic struc-
ture of American institutions and the precipitous decline in trust re-
posed in those institutions.
Let me not mince words. As a people, Americans have become
highly distrustful and disrespectful of institutions, ranging from the
basic social unit of the traditional nuclear family to churches and syna-
gogues, schools and universities, and in this election season, of govern-
ment itself. Courts-the justice system-are no exception to this
powerful trend. In my view, the trend is broad-based and deep
enough to be profoundly disturbing.
What explains this trend of distrust and disrespect? Part of the an-
swer, I believe, lies in America's inherent, culturally rooted suspicion
of power. We are, at bottom, an anti-power society. We are a revolu-
tionary society. Unlike the people of Canada, who peacefully sepa-
rated from Britain,' we in the United States chose the path of
violence.2 We appealed to a higher authority. We appealed to Na-
ture's God, to natural law, and ultimately, to the natural or inalienable
rights, in Jefferson's words, of the individual to be free to make his or
her own destiny.3 That in large part was the American story that un-
folded after the Revolution, especially the conquering of the frontier
and expanding westward to the Pacific and beyond. We even hear this
in our contemporary music, such as the country and western song
(which I hear a lot in Little Rock) called "Independence Day."'4 The
* Judge Starr is currently the special prosecutor for the Whitewater investiga-
tion. Prior to this, Judge Starr served as Solicitor General of the United States. He
also has served as a United States Circuit Judge for the District of Columbia and as
Counselor to United States Attorney William French Smith. Judge Starr served as
law clerk to United States Court of Appeals Judge David W. Dyer and to Chief Jus-
tice of the Supreme Court Warren E. Burger. These remarks were presented as part
of the John Sonnet Lecture Series at Fordham University School of Law on Novem-
ber 3, 1994. The remarks have been lightly edited and footnotes have been added, but
they retain the form and style of the oral remarks.
1. See generally Anne-Marie Mawhiney, Towards Aboriginal Self-Government:
Relations Between Status Indian Peoples and the Government of Canada 1969-1984,
at 23-26 (1994) (discussing the relationship between Canada and Britain): Carl
Wittke, A History of Canada (rev. ed. 1933) (explaining the influence of France and
Britain on Canada's history).
2. See American Violence: A Documentary History 13-18 (Richard Hofstadter
& Michael Wallace eds., 1970); Charles A. Beard & Mary R. Beard, A Basic History
of the United States 102-19 (1944).
3. See Claude G. Bowers, Jefferson and the American Way of Life, in The Heri-
tage of Jefferson 13, 13-15 (Claude G. Bowers et al. eds., 1944); Dumas Malone, Jef-
ferson and the Rights of Man 153 (1951); David N. Mayer, The Constitutional
Thoughts of Thomas Jefferson 75-79 (1994).
4. Martina McBride, Independence Day (BMG).
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song has very little to do with the Fourth of July and much to do with
individuality and autonomy.
That is another part of the answer of our cultural distrust of institu-
tions. Culturally, we believe, above all, in the individual. The rights
of the individual are of the highest order in our constellation of values.
Thus, we as a people are inherently suspicious when government in-
trudes into the sphere of individuality and autonomy. This is an attri-
bute that unites the ACLU in Greenwich Village and Sagebrush
Rebellion leaders from the far West. Culturally, we favor not society,
but the individual. We root for the little guy, the self-made woman,
the self-made man. We talk about our freedom to define ourselves, to
do what we want to do, and to be all that we can be, including march-
ing to the beat of our own drummer. Cowboys, Lone Rangers, Henry
David Thoreaus, Huckleberry Finns-these are our historic, tradi-
tional cultural icons. "Up the Organization," "Do Your Own Thing,"
"I Gotta Be Me"-these are our individualistic mottos and mantras.
The third reason for our growing distrust of institutions is scandal.
Increasingly, we think our institutions lie to us and deceive us. Water-
gate was a cultural and political watershed in this respect. Since
Watergate, we as a people are prepared to believe the worst. It was
one thing for President Eisenhower to lie about the United States
sending spy planes over the then Soviet Union, although it cannot be
doubted that the shooting down of Gary Francis Powers' U-2 plane in
1958 sent shock waves of disbelief through the country. We believed
in our institutions, and we thought well of the President and believed
what he had to say. "I like Ike" was an appropriate slogan for a coun-
try that sat together with their families and watched Fred McMurray
in "My Three Sons" or "Leave it to Beaver." Adlai Stevenson was
perfectly gracious and gallant in his unsuccessful quest for the Oval
Office. Politics seemed not so nasty. That was when America was
more tuned in to "Ozzie and Harriett," the "Donna Reed Show" and
"I Love Lucy" than to Lenny Bruce and Reefer Madness. Kids in
trouble meant an illegal six-pack, not an Uzi or a crack pipe. Quaint
as it may seem, there was a time, not so long ago, when "60 Minutes"
simply meant an hour in the day, not the reporting of yet another
scandal befalling corporate, political or legal America.
These related themes-suspicion of power, the primacy of the indi-
vidual and the culture of scandal-define our life together as a people
in large measure in the 1990s (along with themes of inclusiveness, di-
5. See Quincy Wright, Espionage and the Doctrine of Non-Intervention in Internal
Affairs, in Essays on Espionage and International Law 3, 17 (Roland J. Stranger ed.,
1962); see also James Reston, U.S. Concedes Flight Over Soviet, Defends Search for
Intelligence; Russians Hold Downed Pilot a Spy, N.Y. Times, May 8, 1960, at 1 (ad-
mitting that a plane equipped for intelligence purposes was flying over the Soviet
Union). See generally Jef Verschueren, International News Reporting: Metaprag-
matic Metaphors and the U-2, at 33, 41-99 (1985) (analyzing the news coverage sur-
rounding the downing of the U-2).
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versity and egalitarianism that are beyond the ambit of my remarks
this evening).
My current role in Little Rock as independent counsel is illustrative
of the confluence of these broad social trends. In the aftermath of
Watergate, Senator Sam Ervin of North Carolina-who chaired the
Senate select committee of the Watergate investigation and who be-
came a folk hero in the mid-1970s-held hearings on whether an in-
dependent Department of Justice should be established.6 This
proposed independence of our nation's law department was quite rad-
ical. The idea was that the Attorney General of the United States
would be like the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, independ-
ent of the President of the United States. The idea, which was embod-
ied in a piece of proposed legislation,7 was rejected, but in its place-
more modestly-came the Ethics in Government Act of 1978,8 with
its vision of independence. This is the moral vision of the "independ-
ent counsel," or what was once called the "special prosecutor." It
means a prosecutor not appointed by the President or the Attorney
General-the model of such memorable examples as Archibald Cox
and Leon Jaworski-and who is appointed instead by the courts and
who functions independently of the Executive Branch.
Why this independence from the executive branch? Why this inde-
pendence from the President and any subordinate officer? The idea,
again, is mistrust and suspicion of power. Just as no one should be the
judge in his or her own case-the theory goes-we should not, as a
matter of law, trust anyone appointed by the President or the Attor-
ney General to investigate the President or other high ranking officers
of the executive branch who are answerable to the President. We take
a page from Lord Acton: "Power tends to corrupt, and absolute
power corrupts absolutely."9
These trendlines are applicable to the courts as well. Judges, like
others who wield power, can behave in ways that are viewed by the
people as inappropriate or imperious. The great debate that swirls
6. See Removing Politics from the Administration of Justice: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1974); see also William B. Gwyn, The Indeterminacy of the Separation of
Powers and the Federal Courts, 57 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 474, 484 (1989) (stating that
Senator Sam Ervin proposed an "independent" Justice Department); Jeremy Rabkin,
At the President's Side: The Role of the White House Counsel in Constitutional Policy,
56 Law & Contemp. Probs. 63, 78 (1993) (same).
7. See Removing Politics from the Administration of Justice: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1974).
8. 5 U.S.C app. §§ 101-505 (Supp. V 1993).
9. J. Dalberg-Acton, Acton-Creighton Correspondence, in Essays on Freedom
and Power 357, 364 (G. Himmelfarb ed., 1948).
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over Roe v. Wade,'° the issue called right-to-die"l and the unsettling
world of Dr. Jack Kevorkian' 2 is about morality, about competing vi-
sions of right and wrong, good and evil and differing moral visions
about life-when life begins and who controls its termination.
But the debate is also about power and the appropriateness of
courts making fundamental decisions about social policy in America.
So here ideas and visions clash: Are judges and Justices of the
Supreme Court simply protecting individual rights and liberties
against majoritarian forces that would oppress or even enslave indi-
viduals? Or, on the other hand, are judges abusing their power? Are
they usurpers, perhaps pursuing their moral vision of the good society,
but in the process tearing at our democratic roots society and the right
of the people, through elected representatives, to govern themselves?
Our suspicion of power readily includes judicial power. Courts, by
their nature, tend to exalt the individual as against the organized
forces of society. They protect individual liberty and dignity interests.
This characteristic dovetails with one powerful current in our life as a
society. We like the individual and individual rights, and so do courts.
But, as to the third broad social current-scandal-the courts, them-
selves, sadly, have not been free from taint. Before the watershed of
Watergate, Justice Abe Fortas resigned in disgrace,' 3 and the specter
of scandal engulfed Judge G. Harrold Carswell14 and (in my opinion,
unfairly so) Judge Clement Haynsworth.15 Since that time, with
astonishing regularity, sitting federal judges have been indicted, and at
times convicted, of serious criminal offenses. More recent confirma-
10. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
11. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990)(holding that clear and convincing evidence of an incompetent patient's wishes is re-
quired for the court to permit the termination of death-prolonging procedures); In re
Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 663 (N.J. 1976) (stating that the Supreme Court has recog-
nized the right of privacy, which presumably is broad enough to encompass a patient's
desire to decline medical treatment); see also John A. Powell & Adam S. Cohen, The
Right to Die, 10 Issues L. & Med. 169 (1994) (suggesting that our society continues to
struggle with the debate over the right to die).
12. See Powell & Cohen, supra note 11, at 172; see, e.g., Dan Colburn, Debate on
Assisted Suicide Gains Steam, Wash. Post, May 10, 1994, at 8; Jacqueline Weaver, Re-
flections on Life and How it Ends, N.Y. Times, June 5, 1994, at 3.
13. Bruce A. Murphy, Fortas: The Rise and Ruin of a Supreme Court Justice 55-
77 (1988) (describing Fortas' career on the Supreme Court); The Supreme Court Jus-
tices 474 (Clare Cushman ed., 1993) (explaining that Fortas resigned from the Court
after Life Magazine published a story about his involvement with an indicted stock
manipulator).
14. See Nomination of George Harrold Carswell To Be Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
15. See Nomination of Clement F. Haynsworth, Jr. To Be Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1970); see also John P. Frank, Clement Haynsworth, the
Senate and the Supreme Court (1991) (discussing Haynsworth's nomination to the
Supreme Court and suggesting that the defeat of his nomination was purely political).
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tion battles over various nominees to the nation's highest Court bear
witness to scandal engulfing the Article III branch.16 As I can person-
ally attest, even appointments of independent counsel by a panel of
judges, as provided by the Ethics in Government Act, have not been
immune from controversy. Evil or improper motives have freely been
attributed to judges with exemplary and lengthy records of distin-
guished service.
The scathing criticisms of our justice system, including the broad-
sides against the legal profession itself, can fully be understood only
against the backdrop of this broader social and cultural context. But
looming large in the criticism of courts and the law, and specifically in
lawyers and in the legal profession, are features that are peculiar to
the descent of our profession into the lower regions of public disre-
spect. In particular, our hard, cutting-edge individualism has resulted
in a remarkably different litigation culture than the one John F. Son-
nett'7 helped to nurture and preserve.
Several years ago, in downtown Los Angeles, the American Bar
Foundation presented its fifty-year service award to a remarkable and
distinguished practitioner from San Francisco, Moses Lasky. Mr.
Lasky, in accepting the award marking his half-century of service to
courts, clients and the legal profession, reminisced about his life in the
law. Memories of great episodes in life, of relationships with great
lawyers of integrity and wisdom, including lawyers of the other side, of
teachers and mentors in the law came flooding through.
Then, the tone of the remarks shifted abruptly. Looking back over
the span of five decades of law practice, Mr. Lasky suggested that
sometime in the mid- to late 1970s, the practice of law changed. It
stopped being fun. It became less civil, less genteel and considerably
more commercialized.
It is by no means coincidental that the decline in professional satis-
faction within the legal profession, captured by the pointed remarks of
Moses Lasky, has been accompanied by growing expressions of disap-
proval by the American people of our profession and of the justice
16. Nomination of Judge Clarence Thomas To Be Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1991).
17. John Sonnett, a 1936 graduate of Fordham School of Law, was know interna-
tionally as a pre-eminent trial and appellate lawyer. Prior to his death in 1969, Mr.
Sonnett was a senior partner at the firm of Cahill Gordon & Reindel. Mr. Sonnett
had also served as an Assistant Attorney General and Chief of the Antitrust Division
of the United States Department of Justice. During World War II, Mr. Sonnett was
special counsel to the Under Secretary of the Navy, and he conducted the final Navy
investigations of the attack on Pearl Harbor.
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system more generally. Our explosive growth as a profession,18 in
terms of sheer numbers, has placed extraordinary burdens on our now
endangered traditions of civility and professionalism. These baleful
developments, along with bottom line economic pressures, is a story
that is discouragingly familiar to bench and bar and need not be retold
here.
In litigation, pretrial discovery is, and has been, the great battle-
field. The age of gentility having been replaced by the culture of Ju-
rassic Park,' 9 albeit Jurassic park in pin stripes, pitched battles are
now waged, in an environment partaking of nonviolent but total war,
by litigators and trial lawyers across the country. Zealous advocacy
has been replaced by decidedly uncivil "in your face" stratagems
designed to browbeat, to demean and to threaten.
How far we have come from the world envisioned by Judge Charles
Clark of the Second Circuit, who served on the great court of Learned
Hand and who was a primary architect of modem pretrial discovery.20
That world was one of rationality, of informing parties to civil litiga-
tion of their respective strengths and weakness through pretrial dis-
covery. Through such now-familiar devices as written interrogatories,
requests for production of documents and depositions of witnesses,
including experts, parties would be able to come to grips with the real-
ities of a case before the jury was in the box and society was put to the
expense of a trial on the merits.2 ' Discovery, then, was the great inno-
vation to modernize, to streamline and to rationalize litigation and
thereby to make the dispute resolution process less reliant on the
courtroom cunning of skilled trial lawyers.
As years went on, discovery the solution, discovery the civil re-
former's dream became discovery the problem, discovery the
nightmare.2" From the shock of the activity of the defense counsel in
the Kodak'3 case, to the swirling controversy over the conduct of the
Seattle law firm of Bogle & Gates,' 4 to the deposition techniques of
18. In 1979, 57,676 people across the country took the bar examination. See The
Lawyers Almanac 1981-82, at 284-85 (1981). In contrast, in 1992, 72,461 people
across the county took the bar examination. See The Lawyers Almanac 1994, at 724
(1994).
19. Jurassic Park (Universal 1993).
20. Judge Clark was the Reporter to the original Federal Rule drafting committee.
Jack B. Weinstein, After 50 Years of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Are the
Barriers to Justice Being Raised?, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1901, 1903-04 (1989).
21. See generally William A. Glaser, Pretrial Discovery and the Adversary System
9-12 (1968) (setting forth the aims of discovery, including to diminish the amount of
trickery embedded in our legal system and to reduce the number of cases that go to
trial).
22. See Theodore Y. Blumoff et al., Pretrial Discovery: The Development of Pro-
fessional Judgment § 2.1, at 9-12 (1993).
23. See Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 74 F.R.D. 613, 615 (S.D.N.Y.
1977).
24. See Washington State Physicians Ins. Exch. & Ass'n v. Fisons Corp., 858 P.2d
1054, 1074-79 (1993) (holding that trial court should have sanctioned the defendant or
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Houston's legendary Joe Jamail,2 a growing sense of disquiet and
unease was spreading over lawyer behavior and law firm behavior.
The ideal of Atticus Finch, the courageous lawyer carrying out an un-
popular assignment with grace and dignity, was jettisoned and re-
placed by what judge after judge came to view as lawyer as Rambo,
seen in courts across the country every day.
Two years ago, a very prominent and highly successful trial lawyer
made a presentation for a group of litigators about how to conduct
oneself in pretrial discovery. 26 In his Hobbesian world, litigation was
simply a jungle. In his sinister world, the other side was not only not
to be trusted, but just the opposite. The other side would deliberately
deceive; they would improperly withhold or would fail to respond.
What to do? The lawyer advised his fellow lawyers as follows:
"The answer is obvious: Be unreasonable. If you are unreasonable,
the Judge will give you what you want."'27
The trial lawyer went on to urge planning in advance, to anticipate
that the other side would be obstreperous. Thus, he suggested: "You
know what is coming when you are seeking discovery. Go ahead and
prepare a draft motion to compel," he urged his listeners. "Try to
develop evidence of slowness in response, bring this promptly to the
judge's attention, and then try to get a default judgment entered
against the other side."
This pattern is now a standard part of the modem litigator's play
book. It emphasizes attacks, presuming bad faith on the other side,
immediate repairing to the trial judge with a laundry list of litigation
sins by one's opponent and seeking the imposition of severe sanctions,
including entry of default judgment.
This brass-knuckles approach to litigation is now commonplace. In
its most pathological form, it has come to have a name of its own-the
sanctions tort.2' Using sanctions prematurely, at times on the heels of
wildly overbroad discovery requests, including requests for attorney-
client privileged material or attorney work product, which of course
enjoy fundamental protection in our law,2 9 the trial becomes one fo-
the defendant's attorneys for discovery abuse); Sharon Walsh, State Court Sanctions
Firm for Failure to Disclose, Wash. Post, Nov. 29, 1993, § f (Financial), at 7.
25. See Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34,51-57
(Del. 1993) (discussing Jamail's misconduct with respect to discovery in an addendum
to the opinion); Excerpts: A Delaware Court Criticizes Deposition Behavior of At-
torney, Nat'l L. J., Feb. 21, 1994, at 22.
26. See James E. Butler, Jr. & Patrick A. Dawson, The Bench as Battleground:
The Discovery Process is Broke and Only Judges Can Fix It (1992).
27. Id. at 4-5.
28. See, eg., Charles F. Herring Jr., The Rise of the Sanctions Tort, Tex. Law., Jan
28, 1991, at 22 (describing the sanctions tort as a "whole new arena of outcome-deter-
minative pretrial gamesmanship").
29. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct 1.6 (1983); Model Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility DR 4-101(B) (1980).
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cused on the party's conduct and on the conduct of the party's
counsel.
This is a new age of barbarism, and it is increasingly the order of the
day. What drives this new age of barbarism is not unrelated to the
themes articulated earlier-our aggressive individuality, or breaking
bonds of professional community through an exaltation of the individ-
ual scrapping to get his or her way and achieve his or her goals, and,
finally, the culture of scandal. It is the same value system in modem
civil litigation as that undergirding negative advertising in politics. Do
not debate the merits of issues; do not engage in the genuine clash of
ideas. Manipulate, distort and hopefully destroy. And in extreme sit-
uations, engage in character assassination. As in politics, the law and
the legal profession have been demeaned and demoralized quite seri-
ously in the eyes of the public.
This new age of litigation barbarism is most frightfully evident in
the super-high stakes world of modem tort law. Tort litigation now
means go-for-broke Rambo discovery tactics in this demoralized
world now full blown upon us.
The engine driving the demonic machine is very simple to iden-
tify-dollars, very big dollars. It is the crassest, most greedy, avari-
cious dimension of the fearsome commercialization of the legal
profession. Gun-slinging competition is continually under way for the
title, King of Torts, carrying with it not only fame and prestige but
income levels that would impress even the partners of Goldman
Sachs.30 One trial lawyer now seeking federal elective office listed his
earned income for the past twelve months as $12 million;31 and this is
a trial lawyer who has never had his trials on Court TV or featured in
the National Law Journal. He is just a middle-class trial lawyer.
The astronomical, mind-boggling levels of income are traceable to
one primary source-the modem day phenomenon of punitive dam-
ages. Modern day punitive damages is the modem day lottery-not
many winners, but a legion of wannabe winners who are competing
vigorously in courtrooms across America. These are damages
designed not to compensate an injured victim, but to punish and to
deter antisocial conduct. As every first-year student learns, the pur-
pose of damages in our civil law is to compensate, to make whole.
Volume 2 of Blackstone's ancient commentaries32 makes the point
powerfully. The criminal nature of punitive damages, until recently,
made scholarly commentators and defense attorneys uneasy. No
30. See Gary Taylor, O'Quinn Shoots for 'Tort King' Crown, Nat'l L. J., Oct. 17,
1994, at Al.
31. The attorney referred to is C. Fredrick Overby, a partner in the firm of Butler,
Wooten, Overby & Chelley with offices in Atlanta and Columbus, Georgia.
32. 2 William Blackstone, Commentaries *396.
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lesser light than Prosser in his Law of Torts politely called punitive
damages in the civil law "rather anomalous."33 Indeed, our Yankee
forebears in New Hampshire said over a century ago that it is difficult
on principal to understand why, when the sufferer by a tort has been
fully compensated for his suffering, he should recover anything
more.' This from a New Hampshire Supreme Court opinion in 1873.
Punitive damage awards have become such a commonplace occur-
rence-albeit, so as not to overstate, not a daily occurrence-that we
are no longer taken back by news of an award in the many millions, or
even billions of dollars. It bears noting, however, that this is, all things
considered, quite new, even though the concept of punitive damages is
ancient in our law.35 Indeed, statistics show that "hit-the-jackpot"
levels of awards are quite novel.
A brief historical note:
A recent study found that the largest punitive damages award in the
nineteenth century-including verdicts set aside as excessive by re-
viewing courts-was a modest $4,500.36 Translated into our cheap-
ened coin of the realm, that is $58,000 in modem-day dollars.37
But if that seems like the unenlightened bad old days, as of 1955-
when Adlai Stevenson was preparing a second time to square off
against "I Like Ike"-the largest punitive damages award in the his-
tory of California was $75,000.38 The movement towards large awards
got under way in the 1960s and then took off on size in the 70s and
80s.
This, ironically, has come at a time of considerable regulatory activ-
ity and the growth of the modem administrative and regulatory state.
That is, at a time when avenues of marketplace regulation at various
levels of government, the need for common law instruments-through
litigators on a case-by-case basis-would seem to have declined.
There is, at least in theory, less of a gap than in the nineteenth century
in terms of disincentives to engage in outrageous and wanton
misconduct.
What flows from all of this? In my view, it is time to get at one of
the root causes of that which is wrong with our life together as a pro-
fession. It is time to think the heretofore unthinkable and to reexam-
33. W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 2, at 9 (5th
ed. 1984).
34. Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 343 (1873).
35. See Gerald W. Boston, Punitive Damages in Tort Law § 1.2, at 2, §§ 1.7-1.10,
at 11-16 (1993).
36. Brief of the American Institute of Architects et al. at 14, Pacific Mut. Life Ins.
Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991) (No. 89-1279) (citing New Orleans, J. & G.N.RR. v.
Hurst, 36 Miss. 660 (1859)).
37. Id
38. Id. at 16.
1995]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
ine the modem institution, by abolishing punitive damages. On
reflection, it will be seen that this is not so unthinkable after all.
Several states-Michigan, 39 New Hampshire,40 Nebraska 4 1 and
Washington 4 2-do not have punitive damages. Yet, life seems to go
on. And, despite their origins in ancient English case law, the law in
England, upon close analysis, never evolved to the point, as in the
United States, of accepting punitive damages that are expressly
designed to do more than compensate.4 3 And, as illustrated by
Rookes v. Barnard,' a House of Lords decision from thirty years ago,
punitive damages are generally prohibited at modern English com-
mon law.
Abolishing punitive damages would be an important, non-tinkering
step toward real reform in the law and in the profession. It would also
be consistent with one of the bedrock concerns articulated at the out-
set of theses remarks-the problem of power. Cutting across various
philosophical and ideological lines, virtually every Justice on the
Supreme Court in recent years, including Justice Brennan,45 Justice
Marshall,46 Justice Blackmun47 and, most recently, Justice Souter,48
has expressed grave concern about runaway punitive damages
39. See Fellows v. Superior Prods. Co., 506 N.W.2d 534, 536 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993)
("In Michigan, the courts of that State refuse to allow the recovery of punitive dam-
ages.") (citations omitted).
40. See Panas v. Harakis, 529 A.2d 976, 986 (N.H. 1987) ("This jurisdiction forbids
the award of punitive damages.") (citing Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 382, 397 (1873)).
41. See Braesch v. Union Ins., 464 N.W.2d 769, 777 (Neb. 1991) ("[Plunitive dam-
ages are not allowed in Nebraska .... .") (citing Abel v. Conover, 104 N.W.2d 684, 686
(1960)).
42. See Kennewick Educ. Ass'n v. Kennewick Sch. Dist. No. 17, 666 P.2d 928, 930
(Wash. Ct. App. 1983) ("It has long been established that recovery of punitive dam-
ages is contrary to the public policy of the State and will not be allowed unless ex-
pressly authorized by statute."); see also Spokane Truck & Dray Co. v. Hoefer, 25 P.
1072 (1891) (prohibiting punitive damages).
43. See Boston, supra note 35, §§ 1.3-1.6, at 2-10.
44. 1 All E.R. 367 (1964).
45. See, e.g., Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 281-82
(1989) (Brennan, J., concurring) (expressing concern that "punitive damages are im-
posed by juries guided by little more than an admonition to do what they think is
best"). In Browning-Ferris, Justice Brennan suggested stricter scrutiny of punitive
damages awards in cases where there is no statute to guide the jury's decision. Id. at
281.
46. See, e.g., Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 80-86 (1971) (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting) (discussing the negative effect of punitive damage awards on free-
dom of the press).
47. See, e.g., Pacific Mut. Life Ins. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991). In Haslip,
Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, stated: "We note once again our concern
about punitive damages that 'run wild.'" Id.
48. See, e.g., TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2711, 2742
(1993) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). In TXO, Justice Souter joined in Justice




awards.49 That should go a long way toward establishing a moral
consensus.
But the issues about competitiveness and other potential effects on
our economic life will continue to spawn debate among economists.
What should be clear, however, is that we need to think rather cre-
atively about how to abate the trend toward scorched earth, highly
destructive and extremely high stakes litigation that is so demeaning
and demoralizing to officers of the court. The old fashioned virtues in
law of honor, integrity, zealous advocacy and respect for the other
side and of the good faith of the other side is what John Sonnett stood
for. It is these values that, in our own way, we should pursue in the
memory of the great man whose contributions to this institution and
to the courts of law we celebrate tonight.
49. See generally Haslip, 499 U.S. at 9 ("This Court and individual Justices thereof
on a number of occasions in recent years have expressed doubts about the constitu-
tionality of certain punitive damage awards.").
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